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MAJOR CONVOY OPERATION TO MALTA,
10–15 AUGUST 1942 (OPERATION PEDESTAL)
Milan Vego
The resupply convoy to Malta in August 1942 (Operation PEDESTAL) was inoperational terms a major defensive naval and joint operation. It was also
the largest of the many Allied efforts to ensure the survival of Malta against re-
lentless Axis air attacks. Italian accounts referred to the Axis attempt to destroy
the convoy as operation “Mid-August” (Mezzo Agosto). The Allies were well
aware of the enormous risks in making a decision to mount an all-out effort to
bring badly needed supplies to the besieged island. Yet
the consequences of failing to do that would have been
even more disastrous for the Allied campaign in
North Africa and possibly the entire Mediterranean
theater. The execution of Operation PEDESTAL re-
sulted in horrendous losses for the Allies. However,
the ships that reached Malta brought sufficient quan-
tities of fuel and food to keep the island alive until the
great Allied victory at El Alamein in November 1942,
which turned the tide of the war in North Africa. De-
spite the passage of time, the planning, preparation,
and execution of this major naval operation by both
sides offer many lessons on how to employ one’s naval
forces in the littorals that remain valid even today.
OPERATIONAL SITUATION
The fifteen-mile-long island of Malta played a vital
role in British strategy for the Mediterranean since its
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capture in September 1800. Its great military strategic importance was due
largely to its commanding position in the approaches to the western and eastern
Mediterranean. Malta lies near the midpoint of the Mediterranean, about 715
nautical miles from Alexandria and 860 nautical miles from Gibraltar. Only fifty
nautical miles separate Malta from Sicily. The distance between Malta and the
Libyan coast and Cape Bon (Tunisia) are 190 and 175 nautical miles, respec-
tively. Malta’s importance was most dramatic in World War II, when it served as
an air and naval base from which the British could attack Axis convoys to Libya.
For the Allies, resupplying Malta with fuel, ammunition, and foodstuffs was a
major problem because of intensive efforts by the Axis land-based aircraft on
Sicily and in North Africa, in combination with heavy surface forces, subma-
rines, and mines, to cut off the island from its links with the outside world.
In the late spring of 1942, the situation in the central Mediterranean was ex-
tremely unfavorable for the Allies. The British Eighth Army in North Africa was
on the defensive, and Malta was under almost constant attack by Axis aircraft
based in Sicily and North Africa. By April 1942, the chances of Malta’s survival
were low. Reserves of wheat and flour, fodder, benzyl, and kerosene fuel would
not last after mid-to-late June, while stocks of white oil and aviation fuel were
sufficient only until about mid-August. Only about 920 tons of diesel fuel and
two thousand tons of furnace oil for refueling warships were then available.
Stocks of antiaircraft (AA) ammunition were sufficient for only about six weeks
of fighting.1 For these reasons, the Allies attempted a dual resupply convoy oper-
ation in mid-June 1942, one from the west (Operation HARPOON) and another
from the east (Operation VIGOROUS). The Allies suffered significant losses in
both operations. In Operation HARPOON, of a convoy composed of six mer-
chant ships with forty-three thousand tons, only two merchant vessels carrying
a total of eighteen thousand tons of supplies reached Malta.2 In Operation
VIGOROUS, out of eleven ships carrying 81,500 tons only two ships with a total of
fifteen thousand tons of supplies reached the island. The Germans and Italians
sank two merchant ships in the convoy while seven ships received orders to re-
turn to Alexandria or were detached to Tobruk. In addition, damage occurred to
three cruisers, one special service ship, one corvette, and two merchant ships.3
The governor of Malta, Field Marshal Lord Gort, reported to London on 20 June
that the unloading of the ships that reached the island was almost completed
and that he was actively examining how best to husband the existing supplies
until late September.4
The Allied situation in North Africa greatly deteriorated in late June 1942.
The Allied forces abandoned defensive positions in Gazala and Tobruk fell on 21
June. Seven days later the Axis forces were at Matruh and in possession of the air-
fields some 160 miles from Alexandria. Faced with the possibility of Axis air
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attacks on Alexandria, the British dispersed merchant vessels and warships from
the Suez Canal area to the ports of Haifa, Port Said, and Beirut. They also pre-
pared to block Alexandria’s harbor and port facilities. Vice Admiral (acting Ad-
miral) Henry H. Harwood, commander in chief (CINC) of the British
Mediterranean Fleet (April 1942–February 1943), moved his headquarters to
Haifa on 2 July.5 The retreat on land and the move of the fleet from Alexandria
greatly increased the distance that the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Royal Navy
had to cover in order to conduct effective attacks against the Axis convoys in the
central Mediterranean.
By early July 1942, the German Afrika Korps was forced to stop its offensive in
the inconclusive first battle of El Alamein. However, the Germans intensified
their efforts to renew the advance in the fall of 1942 by mounting a large effort to
send additional supplies by sea to North Africa. The Allies were also preparing to
go on the offensive in the fall of 1942. Among the most important tasks was re-
storing Malta’s use as a base for attacks on the Axis convoys to Libya. This was
contingent on having sufficient reserves of fuel, food, and other supplies on
Malta. Otherwise, these shortages would have forced the Allied submarines and
bombers that returned to Malta in mid-July 1942 to leave the island again. In ad-
dition, the shortage of food supplies threatened the civilian populace with star-
vation.6 Despite the mounting losses incurred in resupplying Malta, British
resolve remained unbroken.7
PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS: THE ALLIES
In the aftermath of the failed dual convoy operation in June 1942, the need to
mount another effort to resupply the besieged island of Malta was obvious. First
Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound (1877–1943) agreed with Prime Minister
Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965) that the loss of Malta would be a disaster of
the first magnitude to the British Empire, and probably would be fatal in the
long run to the defenses of the Nile Valley.8 The Allies were willing to accept the
high risks in mounting another convoy operation to resupply Malta. This deci-
sion became easier due to the suspension of the Arctic convoys after the disaster
of convoy PQ-17 to Soviet Russia in early July 1942. At the same time, the easing
of the situation in the Indian Ocean freed enough forces to mount a convoy op-
eration to relieve the siege of Malta.9 The failed dual convoy operation in
mid-June 1942 demonstrated the inability of Allied naval and air forces to en-
sure full protection to the Malta convoys in the face of Axis air strength in the
central Mediterranean. Hence, the decision was made that the next major con-
voy operation to Malta would be mounted from the west only.10
One of the worst problems for the Allies was a highly fragmented command
organization in the Mediterranean. Even two years after the outbreak of
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hostilities in the Mediterranean, the Allied command organization lacked a sin-
gle theater commander responsible for the planning and execution of opera-
tions by all three services. In June 1939, the British established the Middle East
Command with the responsibility for all operations there and in the Western
Desert. During the war, its responsibility extended to include Greece, East Af-
rica, Aden, the Persian Gulf, and Libya. However, the three services were individ-
ually responsible for defense of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
CINC of the Middle East had control over only ground forces. Directly subordi-
nate to him were the British Troops in Egypt; the British 8th, 9th, and 10th ar-
mies; Persia and Iraq Command; and forces in Sudan. The other two service
chiefs were Air Officer, CINC Royal Air Force Middle East Command and CINC,
Mediterranean. The former had under his command air units based in the West-
ern Desert and Malta. The principal British naval commanders in the Mediterra-
nean in the summer 1942 were Flag Officer, Force H (Vice Admiral Edward N.
Syfret), Rear Admiral 15th Cruiser Squadron (Philip L. Vian), Vice Admiral in
Charge, Malta (Ralph Leatham), and Rear Admiral, Alexandria (G. A.
Creswell).11
What the Allies Knew
One of the key prerequisites for sound planning is accurate, timely, reliable, and
perhaps most important, relevant information on the situation. In that respect,
the Allies had fair knowledge of Italian and German naval dispositions and de-
ployments of their land-based aircraft in the central Mediterranean prior to exe-
cution of the resupply operation to Malta. The most important sources of
intelligence were the Allied interception and decoding of most of the German
Enigma messages. They not only had solid knowledge of German naval and air
dispositions, content of the Luftwaffe’s operation orders, air reconnaissance re-
ports, and U-boat observations but also the appreciation of the situation by
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, CINC South (Oberbefehlshaber Sued) and his
subordinate commanders. Intelligence obtained by reading German radio traf-
fic was distributed to major Allied commanders in the form of special intelli-
gence summaries by the Admiralty’s Operations Intelligence Centre in London.
Based on analysis of the Enigma messages, the Allies assessed that on 22 July
1942 the Italians had deployed at Tarent (Taranto) four battleships (1 Littorio, 3
Cavour); three six-inch cruisers (Abruzzi, Garibaldi, and Aosta) at Navarino
(Pylos today), Greece; two eight-inch cruisers at Messina, Sicily; five destroyers,
two torpedo boats, two submarines, and eighteen motor torpedo boats (MTBs)
at various bases in Sicily; four MTBs at Pantelleria; and two six-inch cruisers, six
submarines, and three destroyers at Cagliari, Sardinia.
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Allied intelligence also estimated that at Naples were one Italian six-inch
cruiser in dock (and not serviceable), three destroyers, and eight submarines.
They noted that the number of destroyers at Tarent varied between ten and
twenty according to convoy requirements from Italy to Greece, Crete, and North
Africa. Allied intelligence believed that if Axis leaders suspected them of launch-
ing convoys to Malta, the Italians would most likely establish a patrol line of
three or four submarines between Sardinia and the French North Africa’s coast,
and four submarines would probably be on patrol in the triangle of
Cartagena–Ibiza–Algiers. They (incorrectly) estimated that the German
U-boats did not appear “to have maintained patrols in the western Mediterra-
nean.” In their view, the German U-boats encountered in that area “so far were
apparently on transit.” Allied intelligence also provided detailed analysis of the
deployment of the French Navy and French shipping routes across the western
Mediterranean.12
As to enemy air strength, the Allies estimated that on 23 July, the Luftwaffe
had 315 aircraft, including one hundred long-range and torpedo bombers on
Sicily and fifty on Sardinia. In their view, the increase in the number of
long-range bombers was through the movement of two air groups (each consist-
ing of sixty-five to seventy aircraft) from Crete, due supposedly not to any oper-
ational needs but to the lack of fuel on Crete.13 The Allies assessed that the
Luftwaffe had on Sardinia twenty Ju-88 bombers, while the Italian Air Force
(IAF) had fifteen long-range bombers, thirty single-engined fighter aircraft,
thirty-five torpedo bombers, twenty reconnaissance aircraft, and thirty coastal
seaplanes. On Sicily, the Luftwaffe had 120 long-range bombers, twelve recon-
naissance bombers, and thirty-six single- and twenty-seven twin-engined fight-
ers. The IAF had about eighty long-range bombers, 120 single-engine fighters,
twenty torpedo bombers, fifteen dive-bombers, ten reconnaissance aircraft, and
fifty coastal seaplanes.14
Allied intelligence revised its estimates of enemy air dispositions on 9 August
1942. It erroneously concluded that there were no German aircraft based on Sar-
dinia, while the IAF had fifteen to twenty long-range bombers, fifteen to twenty
fighter-bombers, thirty-five to forty torpedo bombers, twenty reconnaissance
aircraft, and thirty coastal seaplanes. The Luftwaffe’s strength then consisted of
144 long-range bombers, twenty-seven reconnaissance bombers, and sixty-six
single-engined fighters. The IAF had deployed seventy long-range bombers,
thirty-five to forty torpedo bombers, fifteen to twenty dive-bombers, forty re-
connaissance aircraft, fifty coastal seaplanes, fifteen to twenty fighter-bombers,
and ninety-five single-engined fighters. Serviceability of the aircraft was about
55 percent of the above strength figures.15
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On 5 August 1942, the Allies learned from Enigma intercepts that the Ger-
mans interpreted the reduction in RAF activity over Malta and Egypt as an indi-
cation that the enemy planned to mount a large-scale operation to supply Malta.
The Germans also believed that the Allies would launch diversionary attacks on
the Panzerarmee (Panzer Army) Afrika and a combined operation against
Mersa Matruh. The Germans planned to counter the enemy’s possible moves by
redeploying Luftwaffe aircraft from Greece to Sicily and increasing combat
readiness of air units in both areas. They also planned to discuss with the com-
mander of the Italian air forces on Sicily joint bombing and torpedo attacks and
training exercises.16
The Allies learned from Enigma messages that on 6 August the Germans
alerted their agents at Algeciras about the possibility that a Malta-bound convoy
was preparing to sail and that all reporting stations should increase vigilance.
German agents reported the arrivals and departures of Allied warships from Gi-
braltar during the night of 8–9 August. Rome passed that information to
Cagliari in its daily bulletin on 9 August. The Allies also read the Enigma report
that at 0925 on 10 August Tangier informed Madrid that based on personal ob-
servation a convoy of thirty-seven ships, including two large transports, were
outside the entrance to the Strait of Gibraltar sailing on an easterly course. The
station in Ceuta also reported the movement of various enemy ships eastward.17
Plans
The Allies considered four variants of the plan to resupply Malta from the west,
designated plans A, B, C, and D, respectively. Most of these plans revolved
around the availability of the 17,580-ton (full load) U.S. aircraft carrier Ranger
(CV 4) for the operation. The Admiralty was in favor of plan A, if Ranger and its
five destroyers were available at Scapa Flow. Under plan A two battleships (Nel-
son and Rodney), deployed with the Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean, would
also take part in the operation. In the Admiralty’s view, training of the Eastern
Fleet would be completed earlier if the Malta convoy were run in July instead of
August and there would be no need to remove the carrier Indomitable from the
Eastern Fleet. The Admiralty received information from Malta that the island
could survive until September. Hence, there was no great urgency to run a resup-
ply convoy in July. This, in turn, would affect the degree to which the British gov-
ernment would press the Americans to allow Ranger to be employed in the
Mediterranean as envisaged under plan A.18
Plan B would also require the movement of Ranger to Scapa Flow. The Admi-
ralty favored plan A and was concerned if both plans were presented to the
Americans they might opt for plan B. In the Admiralty’s view, if plan B were car-
ried out in July it would not have allowed adequate time for preparations. If the
1 1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 1, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/8
Americans rejected plan A, then the Admiralty favored a modified plan B to be
executed in the August new moon period in order to allow more time for the car-
rier Victorious to become familiar with the U.S. fighter squadrons. To execute the
modified plan B, it would require that Ranger arrive at Scapa Flow and transfer
twenty-four folding-wing Martlet fighters (U.S. Wildcats) with their crews to
Victorious; Ranger would operate with the Home Fleet to relieve Victorious dur-
ing its absence from the fleet. Ranger would need to retain at least twelve Mart-
lets. The modified plan B would not interfere with the schedule for PQ convoys
bound for Russia. However, the execution of plan B depended on whether
Ranger would be available for service with the Home Fleet until the end of Au-
gust. Plan C was not acceptable because protection of both the convoy and the
battleships by obsolete Fulmar fighters carried by Victorious was inadequate in
the area south of Sardinia. This assessment was based on the heavy losses suf-
fered from enemy land-based aircraft during Operation HARPOON.19
Plan D contemplated the convoy operation be executed in August using Brit-
ish forces exclusively. Among advantages of this plan were that it would not re-
quire American help and more time would be available for training and for the
buildup of a heavy bomber force in the Middle East in support of the operation.
Another advantage was that there would be one more hour of darkness in Au-
gust than in July. A major disadvantage of plan D was that it would also delay re-
lief to Malta by one month. It would delay the assembly and training of the
Eastern Fleet by two and one-half months, because its sole carrier Indomitable
and two battleships (Nelson and Rodney) would be detached for the operation in
the Mediterranean. It would also entail holding up the merchant ships destined
for the convoy for another month.20
The Admiralty was in favor of plan A if Ranger could reach Scapa by 30 July.
Failing plan A, it favored the modified plan B to be carried out in August and not
requiring the withdrawal of the carrier Indomitable from the Eastern Fleet. The
risks entailed in plan C were simply unacceptable. Hence, failing plan A or the
modified plan B, the Admiralty had no alternative but to adopt plan D.21
The Admiralty assumed that it would be possible to run a PQ convoy toward
the end of June and another in late July. The August PQ convoy would be delayed
until the first week of September. In the Admiralty’s view it would be possible to
maintain a schedule of three PQ convoys every two months. Adopting plan D
made it unnecessary to send Ranger to the United Kingdom. However, because
of the severe shortage of cruisers and destroyers, British deputy prime minister
Clement Attlee and the chief of the British staff, General Alan Brooke
(1883–1963), suggested that the government request from the United States the
loan to the Royal Navy of two heavy cruisers (Tuscaloosa, Wichita) and four de-
stroyers until the end of August.22
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The Admiralty in London conducted the planning for the new resupply con-
voy to Malta, dubbed Operation PEDESTAL. This allowed it to make decisions
without the extensive use of communications, enhancing operations security. In
addition, the planners could easily obtain general views on policy, and the advice
and help of the Naval Staff were always at hand.23 The plan for Operation
PEDESTAL was similar to the plan for the convoy from Gibraltar in mid-June
1942.24 The planners assumed that surprise would be difficult to achieve because
the Axis had excellent intelligence in the Gibraltar area.25
In its broad outlines, the plan for Operation PEDESTAL visualized the assem-
bly of sufficient forces to counter diverse threats posed by the Axis air and naval
forces based in Sardinia, Sicily, southern Italy, and Tripolitania.26 Operation
VIGOROUS failed due to the inability of Allied airpower to damage enemy battle-
ships sufficiently to force them to withdraw from the convoy. An acute shortage
of AA ammunition and fuel was part of the reason that the convoy was dis-
patched to Malta after dark on 15 June. Because it was impossible to increase the
strength of the land-based aircraft, the only solution to strengthen defenses of
the next convoy for Malta was to assign much stronger naval forces to its de-
fense.27 Therefore, the plan required a sufficient number of fighter aircraft to
match the enemy fighters and to deal with the enemy heavy bombers and tor-
pedo bombers threatening the convoy.28 The Admiralty made the decision that
in the course of the operation damaged merchant vessels should be scuttled
while all efforts would be made to preserve warships. The intent was not to lose
both escorts and convoy.29
The lessons of the Arctic convoys and those to Malta showed the need for
tankers to accompany the convoy and escorts. However, the British merchant
marine did not have fast (sixteen-knot) tankers in service. The U.S. Maritime
Administration operated two such tankers (Kentucky and Ohio). After some dif-
ficult negotiations, the British government was able to lease these two tankers.
One of them (Kentucky) was sunk during the failed dual convoy operation in
June 1942 so that only one tanker, the 14,150-deadweight-ton (DWT) Ohio (car-
rying 11,500 tons of black and white oil) was assigned to the convoy.30
In planning Operation PEDESTAL, the Allies correctly assumed that the enemy
would concentrate its heavy surface forces in the area south of Sardinia and then
either attack the convoy or draw off Allied escorting forces, leaving the convoy
open to attack by its light forces. They also expected synchronized attacks by en-
emy high-level bombers, torpedo bombers, and dive-bombers on the third and
fourth days, and high-level bombing and torpedo bomber attacks on the second
and fifth days of the operation.31 To minimize losses from enemy aircraft, the
convoy would transit the Sicilian Narrows at night.32
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The planners also made major changes in the strength of the convoy screen
based on the lessons learned in the aftermath of the failed dual convoy operation
in June 1942. One of the main requirements was that the convoy escorts be power-
ful enough to prevent a successful attack by Italian heavy surface forces.33 The Ad-
miralty considered employment of battleships in the Sicilian Narrows, so close to
the enemy airfields in North Africa and Sicily, too risky. Hence, it deployed two
battleships for a purely defensive role. The carrier-based aircraft would play the
key role of inflicting damage and slowing down the Italian battle fleet.34
The planners assigned all three available large aircraft carriers in support of
the operation. Sea Hurricanes and Martlets replaced all obsolete Fulmar fight-
ers. The carriers would be positioned inside the destroyer screen and in the con-
voy’s rear; the carrier aircraft would be employed for attacking the Italian heavy
surface ships based at Messina, Tarent, and Naples in case they posed a threat to
the convoy.35
Task Organization
The entire resupply operation to Malta was under the command of Acting Vice
Admiral Syfret (1889–1972).36 He was in command of Force F, composed of the
convoy and naval forces of direct screen and distant cover and support. Naval
forces assigned to the operation were a collection of ships belonging to the
Home Fleet and Eastern Fleet. Submarines deployed in the eastern Mediterra-
nean were subordinate to CINC of the Mediterranean Fleet in Haifa. Most of the
land-based aircraft were controlled by the RAF’s Mediterranean Command.
The planners had considerable difficulty in assembling a sufficient number of
merchant ships for the new resupply effort due to the heavy losses inflicted by
the German U-boats in the northern Atlantic in the midsummer of 1942. Based
on the request by Malta’s governor to the Admiralty on 3 July, the planners envis-
aged a convoy composed of ten merchant ships with a loading capacity of 75,000
DWT.37 However, they made the decision in mid-July to run a convoy of thirteen
freighters and one tanker with tonnage of about 123,000 tons.38 These ships
would carry mainly flour and ammunition. They allocated each ship a propor-
tion of the total cargo so that a percentage of every commodity was certain to get
through despite expected high losses.39 Planners based the selection of the mer-
chant ships on the assumption that the enemy would mount heavy attacks
against the convoy. To enhance the convoy’s chances of survival, the average
speed of its advance had to be at least fifteen knots. Based on the lessons from
Operation HARPOON, the planners assigned an ocean tug to accompany the con-
voy.40 The intent was that the convoy would leave the United Kingdom about 2
August and arrive at Malta on 13 August. In an attempt to confuse German intel-
ligence, the convoy’s designation, WS.5.21.S (WS for “Winston Specials”), was
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the same as for the convoys from the United Kingdom to Suez and rounding the
Cape of Good Hope.41
Supporting naval forces were divided into four force elements designated
Forces Z, X, Y, and R. Force Z, led by Syfret himself, consisted of two battleships
(Nelson and Rodney) and three large aircraft carriers (Eagle, Indomitable, and
Victorious) with seventy-two fighters and thirty-eight torpedo-bombers, three
cruisers (Sirius, Phoebe, and Charybdis), and the 19th Destroyer Flotilla with
fifteen destroyers. Force X, under command of Rear Admiral H. M. Burrough,
was composed of three light cruisers (Nigeria, Kenya, and Manchester), one AA
ship (Cairo) of the 10th Cruiser Flotilla, eleven destroyers of the 6th Destroyer
Flotilla, and one ocean tug.42 Two of these cruisers (Nigeria and Cairo) were fit-
ted for fighter-direction duties.43 An additional five destroyers were assigned to
provide antisubmarine (A/S) escort for the convoy during its transit from the
United Kingdom to the Strait of Gibraltar.44 Force Y at Malta consisted of two
freighters (Troilus and Orari) and two destroyers. Force R(efueling) was com-
posed of three fleet oilers and one ocean tug plus four corvettes for escort.45
Malta Escort Force (17th Minesweeping Flotilla) consisted of four minesweep-
ers and seven motor launches. In addition, the Admiralty assigned eight destroy-
ers as reserve escorts for the operation. They were intended to provide escort for
Force R and a screen for the carrier Furious.46
Timing
Operation PEDESTAL depended primarily on the Allied ability to assemble a
powerful force and on the timing to outwit the Italians and the Germans. To en-
hance the chances of success, the Allies had to choose a time during a moonless
night. Hence, they considered the time between 10 and 16 August as optimal to
run the convoy operation to Malta from the west. They selected 10 August as the
first day of the operation, D.1 (D + 0 in U.S. terms), for the day when the convoy
with accompanying escorts would enter the Mediterranean.
Other Operations
Under the cover of the convoy operation, the Admiralty also planned two other
minor efforts. During the planning, the British Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles
Portal, raised the issue of increasing the number of fighter aircraft on Malta. By
the end of July, only about eighty fighters were still in service on the island; how-
ever, that number would decline rapidly because the Allies lost about seventeen
aircraft per week. Hence, the planners decided to reinforce Malta’s air defenses
by bringing in some forty Spitfire fighters, ferried by an aircraft carrier prior to
the arrival of the convoy to Malta.47 This would also enhance the chances of suc-
cess of Operation PEDESTAL. The carrier Furious was selected for the operation
(code-named BELLOWS) because the other available carrier, Argus, would require
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a wind speed of at least fifteen knots, which was unlikely in August in the west-
ern Mediterranean.48 The carrier Furious (with four Albacores and forty Spit-
fires) would sail from Gibraltar and after reaching a point south of Sardinia,
approximately 550 miles from Malta, would launch its Spitfires. The Admiralty
directed Syfret that Operation BELLOWS should interfere as little as possible with
Operation PEDESTAL. Furious should not stop at Gibraltar on the way out but
should enter the Mediterranean with the convoy. It planned that five destroyers
should escort Furious back to Gibraltar and the United Kingdom immediately
after fly-off. Force F would provide fighter protection until Furious was well west
of Force F. The fly-off could take place on D.2 or D.3 at Syfret’s discretion and
could be at any time during daylight. This would allow the Spitfires to land at
dusk. Furious must be on a radius 296 nautical miles from position 37° 12' N and
9° 00' E at the time of fly-off.49 A complicating factor was that the planners for
Operation BELLOWS had to use signals versus radio.50
Another element of the plan was to take two merchant ships (Troilus and
Orari) that had survived the June debacle with a screen of two destroyers (Force
Y) out of Malta and bring them to Gibraltar (Operation ASCENDANT). The in-
tent was to mount this effort after dark on D.1.51 Force Y would be suitably
painted and have Italian deck markings. The plan was to sortie from Malta to a
position some thirty nautical miles south of Lampedusa, pass Kelibia (Kélibia),
hug the Tunisian coast to Galita Channel, and then proceed to Gibraltar.52
Support from Other Forces
In support of Operation PEDESTAL were employed Allied submarines and fighter
aircraft based on Malta, patrol aircraft based in Gibraltar, and long-range bomb-
ers of the Middle East Command. The planners prepared an elaborate scheme
for the employment of Allied submarines in support of Operation PEDESTAL.
The initial plan drafted on 20 July contemplated deployment of seven Allied
submarines in the vicinity of Sicily to prevent the Italian surface forces based in
the Tyrrhenian Sea from attacking the convoy during its last leg of transit to
Malta. Specifically, three submarines would take positions between Cape Galle
and Trapani (patrols A, B, and C), three submarines between Cavallo and
Marettimo (patrol areas D, E, F, and G), and one submarine between Volcano
and Cape Milazzo (patrol area H). All patrolling areas would be established by
D.1.53 By late July, the plan for the employment of the Allied submarines was
changed. One submarine would deploy off Milazzo (Sicily’s northwestern coast)
and one off Palermo, while six other submarines would be deployed between
Malta and Pantelleria.54 All submarines would reach their assigned positions by
dawn on D.4 (13 August).55 They would have complete freedom of action in at-
tacking enemy ships, with Italian battleships and cruisers as their primary
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targets. After the convoy passed their patrol line, the submarines would sail on
the surface, on a parallel course with the convoy, and act as its screen. They
would also report on the presence of enemy aircraft in the convoy’s proximity.56
The outcome of Operation PEDESTAL was also contingent on close coopera-
tion with RAF units based on Malta and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. The Al-
lied air strength in Malta on 3 August was 155 serviceable aircraft, including
ninety to ninety-five Spitfire fighters and about fifty-five bombers. This total de-
creased by 10 August to 151 aircraft, including eighty Spitfires. The expected re-
inforcements prior to 13 August were seventy-four aircraft, including
thirty-eight Spitfires from the carrier Furious. On D.3, estimated air strength
would be 202 aircraft, including 113 Spitfires.57 On 11 August, the Allies had
about 140 aircraft organized in nine fighter squadrons, three torpedo squad-
rons, four bomber squadrons, and two reconnaissance aircraft squadrons.58 On
13 August, the Allied air strength on Malta comprised 230 aircraft, of which 155
were operational. This number included ninety fighters, all Spitfires, and
fifty-six long-range bombers (eighteen Beaufighters-coastal, four Beaufighters-
night, four Wellington VIIIs, twenty-four Beauforts, and six Baltimores).59
The planners intended that the Allied aircraft based on Malta would conduct
reconnaissance day and night along the probable routes of enemy naval forces;
attack the Italian and German bases on Sicily, Sardinia, and Pantelleria; protect
the convoy after entering the effective range from Malta; and attack with torpe-
does Italian naval forces entering Tarent.60
The Allied aircraft based in the Western Desert were tasked with the following:
• Locate, shadow, and report all enemy surface forces.
• Protect the convoy from air attack when within their effective range.
• Destroy enemy surface forces.
• Dislocate enemy air forces on the ground by means of low-flying attacks by
Beaufighters, night bombing of Sardinian bases by Liberators, and
large-scale night bombing by Liberators from the Middle East Command.61
On 3 August, Vice Admiral, Malta requested from the Middle East Command
four Liberators for bombing enemy airfields on Sardinia and Sicily during the
nights of D.3–D.4 and D.4–D.5. He also suggested using an additional six
Bostons or similar aircraft suitable for carrying out high-speed daylight bomb-
ing of enemy airfields.62 The RAF would provide long-range escort aircraft from
Gibraltar and Malta to the limit of their effective range. He specifically requested
air reconnaissance between Sardinia and North Africa from D.2 to D.5; between
Cavallo Island Lighthouse and Marettimo (Aegadian Islands) during daylight
hours on D.3 and D.5; and reconnaissance of naval bases Tarent, Messina,
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Palermo, Naples, and Cagliari from D.1 to D.5 to keep track of the enemy surface
vessels. Allies would conduct daylight air patrols between Cavallo and
Marettimo on D.3 to D.5 and dawn patrols between Sardinia and North Africa
from D.2 to D.5.63 Beaufighters would protect Force X from 1930 to dark on D.3
and from daylight on D.4 until Spitfires could take over protection of the convoy.
The torpedo bomber striking force would maintain readiness to attack enemy
surface forces and provide cover for the westward passage of Force X to Gibraltar
on D.4.64 RAF aircraft based at Gibraltar would conduct an antisubmarine patrol
east of the Strait of Gibraltar.65
OPERATIONAL DESIGN
The Allied commanders and planners had to fully evaluate all the aspects of the
operational situation in the Mediterranean prior to and during the planning of
Operation PEDESTAL. In modern terms, this process is called “operational de-
sign.” In generic terms, the principal elements of design for a major naval opera-
tion are ultimate/intermediate objectives, force requirements, balancing of
operational factors against the ultimate objective, identification of enemy and
friendly operational centers of gravity, initial lines of operations, direction
(axis), the operational idea (scheme), and operational sustainment.
The first and the most important step in designing a major naval operation is
to properly determine and articulate its ultimate and intermediate objectives.
The objective of Operation PEDESTAL as stated in the plan was “to pass a convoy
of 14 M.T. [motor tanker] ships through the western Mediterranean to Malta
and to cover the passage of two merchant ships and two destroyers from Malta to
Gibraltar.”66 Expressed differently, the main and ultimate objective of Operation
PEDESTAL was to deliver a sufficient amount of fuel, ammunition, and food sup-
plies to allow Malta to operate as a major naval/air base beyond September 1942.
That objective was operational in its scale.
After the ultimate objective is determined, the next step is to derive a number
of major or minor tactical objectives that would lead collectively to the accom-
plishment of the ultimate objective of the operation. Major tactical objectives in
Operation PEDESTAL were defense and protection of the convoy, neutralization
of the enemy airfields on Sardinia and Sicily, and diversion of enemy forces from
the western to eastern Mediterranean. Under cover of the convoy operation, the
Allies also planned to accomplish a separate major tactical objective—reinforce-
ment of Malta’s air defenses by ferrying some forty Spitfires to the island. An-
other separate but minor tactical objective was to bring to safety two merchant
ships that had survived the HARPOON convoy operation.
An important element of operational design is determining the overall force’s
size/mix for the entire operation. The principal factors in this process are the
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type of operation, the combat potential of friendly and enemy forces, the num-
ber and scale of intermediate objectives and their sequencing, the distances be-
tween the base of operations and the prospective operating area, and weather
and climatological conditions. In addition, intelligence and logistics play a sig-
nificant role in determining the size and composition of one’s forces in a major
naval operation. The operational commander’s judgment and experience are of-
ten the decisive factors in determining the size and composition of the forces
that take part in a major naval operation. The Allies assigned the maximum
available force of aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers to Operation
PEDESTAL. They assigned three fast carriers to a force of distant cover and sup-
port. However, it would probably have been wiser not to conduct the ferrying
operation simultaneously with the resupply effort but instead to assign more de-
stroyers for the carrier Furious to Force Z or Force X, thereby strengthening the
convoy’s air and antisubmarine warfare defenses. The Allies failed to employ a
sufficient number of serviceable long-range bombers of the Middle East Com-
mand in support of Operation PEDESTAL.
The operational commander and planners must first properly harmonize the
factors of space, time, and force against the ultimate objective of the operation.
This means that advantages in one operational factor must offset the deficien-
cies in other factors. Ideally, the operational commander should assess friendly
factors of space, time, and forces individually and then balance them in combi-
nation against the respective ultimate objective. A serious disconnect or mis-
match between the ultimate objective and the corresponding space-time-force
factors might greatly complicate and possibly endanger the success of the entire
operation. If the imbalance cannot be satisfactorily resolved, then the objective
must be changed or scaled down and brought roughly into harmony with the
operational factors.
Operation PEDESTAL was conducted over very long distances. About 1,370
nautical miles separates Glasgow from the Strait of Gibraltar via Bishop Rock.
The distance from the Strait of Gibraltar to port La Valletta, Malta, is just over a
thousand nautical miles. A convoy from Gibraltar to Malta had to sail the dis-
tance of four hundred miles (or twenty-six hours at fifteen knots) within 150
miles from the enemy airfields on Sardinia and Sicily.67 The Allied naval base at
La Valletta, Malta, was favorably located to control the central part of the Medi-
terranean. It lies only about eighty nautical miles from Licata, Sicily, and 360
nautical miles from Benghazi. The distances in nautical miles between Malta
and the Italian naval bases at Cagliari, Sardinia; Naples; and Tarent are 330, 322,
and 337, respectively. The hundred-mile-wide Sicilian Narrows posed a particu-
lar hazard for Allied ships because of numerous mines laid by the Italians and
the short distances to the Axis airfields on Sicily.68 Lack of sea room and presence
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of the enemy mines made it next to impossible to use battleships and carriers be-
yond the Skerki Bank. Hence, for the last 250 miles of the voyage to Malta, the
convoy would have to rely on protection of cruisers and destroyers.69 The Sicil-
ian Narrows were also a suitable area for the employment of the Italian and Ger-
man torpedo craft and cruisers/destroyers. In the early days of the war, the Allies
had easily swept the mines, but this became more difficult and dangerous at the
later stage, when the Italians laid new and more advanced German mines.
After determining the ultimate objective of a major naval operation, the op-
erational commander and his planners must determine corresponding enemy
and friendly operational centers of gravity—a source of massed strength, physi-
cal or moral, or a source of leverage whose serious degradation, dislocation,
neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the en-
emy’s or one’s own ability to accomplish a given military objective. The principal
utility of the concept of center of gravity is in significantly enhancing the chance
that one’s sources of power are used in the quickest and most effective way for
accomplishing a given military objective.
For the Allies the enemy’s operational center of gravity in the second phase of
the operation was clearly German heavy bombers and dive-bombers based on
Sicily and Sardinia. However, in the third phase, the enemy operational center of
gravity shifted to the Italian heavy surface forces in case they sortied out from
their bases. The Allied operational center of gravity was three large aircraft carri-
ers with their fighter aircraft on board. After the passage of the Sicilian Narrows,
the Allied operational center of gravity changed to Force X. Afterward, the oper-
ational center of gravity shifted to the Allied fighter aircraft based on Malta.
OPERATIONAL IDEA
The operational idea (or scheme) is the very heart of a design for a major naval
operation. In essence, it is identical to what strategists commonly call “concept
of operations” (CONOPS) (or sometimes “scheme of maneuver”). Ideally, it
should be bold and provide for speedy execution. The simpler the operational
idea, the higher are its chances of successful execution. The operational idea
should be also sufficiently broad to accommodate changes in the situation in the
course of its execution. It should be novel and avoid stereotyped patterns. The
operational idea should ensure the decisive employment of one’s forces. It
should present the enemy with multidimensional threats that he has little or no
chance of countering successfully. It should also surprise and deceive the enemy.
The idea for Operation PEDESTAL was traditional (see map 1). The unfavor-
able initial geographic position was a major reason why Operation PEDESTAL
was bold but not novel. The Italians and Germans were neither surprised nor de-
ceived; the objective of the operation was all too transparent. The Allies were
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unable to achieve surprise, because the Axis had a large number of agents in the
Gibraltar area.70 The geography of the area restricted considerably the choice of
lines of operation for each element of Force F. It allowed for little or no flexibility
in the employment of the Allied forces. The speed of execution was limited to the
fifteen-knot speed of the convoy.
The Allied operational idea envisaged both simultaneous and successive
movements of several force elements in the western and eastern Mediterranean.
Force F would pass through the Strait of Gibraltar on the night of D.1. Upon
reaching the entrance of the Skerki Bank (an area of relatively shallow water in
the Sicilian Narrows) at about 1900 on D.3, Force Z would turn westward.71
Upon arriving at the entrance to the Skerki Bank in the afternoon on D.3, Force
X and convoy WS.5.21.S would proceed to Malta. Force X would proceed until
the point at the approaches to Malta in the afternoon on D.4, from where the
Malta Escort Force would take over escort of the convoy.72 Force Z, after parting
company from Force X at the entrance to the Skerki Bank in the afternoon of
D.3, would remain in that vicinity until the Beaufighters from Malta took over
protection of the convoy and Force X. On D.4, Force Z would operate to the west
of Sardinia to distract attention from Force Y. After its support was no longer
necessary, Force Z would return to Gibraltar. Force X would return to Gibraltar
as soon as Vice Admiral, Malta could release it from protecting the convoy.73
Minesweepers would clear the channels, thereby avoiding the loss of merchant
vessels as in the convoy operation in June.74 Two merchant ships that had sur-
vived the June debacle, with a screen of two destroyers, would sail out from
Malta to Gibraltar after sundown on D.1, pass through the Sicilian Narrows on
the night of D.2–D.3, and thence sail directly to Gibraltar. A submarine screen of
six British boats would deploy south of Pantelleria and north of the projected
convoy route to intercept Italian naval forces. Two additional submarines would
deploy off Milazzo, Palermo, and the Strait of Messina.75 Under the cover of the
main operation, Operation BELLOWS would be carried out to reinforce Malta’s
air defenses.
The Allied planners properly applied the principles of objective, mass, secu-
rity, and economy of effort in Operation PEDESTAL. However, they violated the
principle of simplicity by adding Operations BELLOWS and ASCENDANT.
In general, planners should assign a highly capable but not overly strong force
to protecting the friendly center of gravity; otherwise, the operation would be
open to a devastating enemy attack. The Allied initial operational center of grav-
ity—the carrier forces—were well protected by the fighter aircraft and AA de-
fenses of each carrier’s screen. However, Force X—the second operational center
of gravity—had to rely only on its own AA defenses.
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13 freighters (Empire Hope, Dorset, Wairangi, Rochester Castle, Waimarana,
Brisbane Star, Port Chalmers, Almeria Lykes, Santa Elisa, Clan Ferguson, Glen-
orchy, Melbourne Star, Deucalion)
1 oiler (Ohio)
Additional escorts from Britain to Gibraltar: 5 destroyers (Keppel, Malcom,
Amazon, Venomous, Wolverine)
FORCE Z
2 battleships (Nelson, Rodney)
3 aircraft carriers (Victorious, Eagle, Indomitable)
72 fighters, 38 torpedo bombers
3 light cruisers (Charybdis, Phoebe, Sirius)
15 destroyers (19th Destroyer Flotilla) (Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Quentin,
Eskimo, Tartar, Wilton, Westcott, Wrestler, Somali, Wishart, Zetland, Ithuriel,
Antelope, Vansittart)
FORCE X
4 light cruisers (10th Cruiser Flotilla) (Nigeria, Kenya, Manchester, Cairo)
11 destroyers (6th Destroyer Flotilla) (Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Foresight, Fury,
Derwent, Bramham, Bicester, Ledbury, Pathfinder, Penn)
1 ocean tug (Jaunty)
FORCE Y
2 freighters (Troilus, Orari)
2 destroyers (Matchless, Badsworth)
FORCE R
3 fleet oil tankers (Brown, Ranger, Dingledale)
4 corvettes (Jonquil, Spirea, Geranium, Coltsfoot)
1 tug (Salvonia)
Malta Escort Force (17th Minesweeping Flotilla)
4 minesweepers (Speedy, Hythe, Hebe, Rye)
7 motor launches (121, 126, 134, 135, 168, 459, 469)
Submarine Group (10th Submarine Flotilla)
2 submarines off Milazzo and Palermo (P.211, P.42)
6 submarines between Malta and Tunisia (P.44, P.222, P.31, P.34, P.46,
Utmost)
OPERATION BELLOWS
1 aircraft carrier (Furious)
RESERVE ESCORT GROUP




Convoy M.W.12 (3 merchant vessels)









2 air recce squadrons
38 Spitfire fighters from Furious
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The Allied sector of the main effort in Operation PEDESTAL was the western
Mediterranean, while the eastern Mediterranean was the sector of secondary ef-
fort. This decision was predetermined because the convoy started its voyage in
Gibraltar and headed toward Malta. The sectors of effort dictate where the prin-
cipal forces and their supporting forces should be concentrated or employed in a
major naval operation. In a defensive major naval operation as was Operation
PEDESTAL, the main Allied forces were those that defended the convoy, Force X.
Force Z, submarines, and land-based aircraft were supporting forces.
V E G O 1 2 5
THE AXIS FORCES
ITALIAN MAJOR SURFACE FORCES
3rd Naval Division (Messina)
3 heavy cruisers (Gorizia, Bolzano, Trieste)
7 destroyers (Aviere, Geniere, Camicia Nera, Legionario, Ascari, Corsaro,
Grecale)
7th Naval Division (Cagliari)
3 light cruisers (Eugenio di Savoia, Raimondo Montecuccoli, Muzio
Attendolo)
4 destroyers (Maestrale, Gioberti, Oriani, Fuciliere)
1 destroyer for mining the Sicilian Narrows (Malocello)
8th Naval Division (Navarino)




18 Italian submarines (Bronzo, Ascianghi, Alagi, Dessié, Avorio, Dandolo,
Emo, Cobalto, Otaria, Axum, Asteria, Brin, Wolframio, Granito, Dagabur,
Giada, Uarsciek, Vellela)
2 German U-boats (U-73, U-333)
LIGHT FORCES
2nd MS Squadron (MS 16, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31)
15th MAS Squadron (MAS 549, 543, 548, 563)
18th MAS Squadron (MAS 556, 553, 533, 562, 560)
20th MAS Squadron (MAS 557, 554, 564, 552)
German S-boats (S30, S59, S58, S36)
Total: 9 cruisers, 17 destroyers, 20 submarines, 10 MS, 13 MAS
LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT (SICILY/SARDINIA)
Italian 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th air squadrons
328 aircraft (90 torpedo bombers, 62 bombers, 25 dive-bombers, 151
fighters)
German II Air Corps
456 aircraft (328 dive bombers, 32 bombers, 96 fighters)
Total: 784 aircraft (328 Italian, 456 German)
Sources: Fioravanzo, La Marina Italiana Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, vol. 5, pp.
410–13; Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys, pp. 129–31; “Operation Pedes-
tal,” Supplement to the London Gazette, p. 4506.
Continued from page 122
19
Vego: Major Convoy Operation to Malta, 10–15 August 1942 (OperationPEDE
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
The operational idea for a major naval operation should include a plausible
plan for operational deception. In general, deception is intended to mislead the
enemy about intentions, future decisions, and friendly courses of action. It aims
to confuse and disorient the enemy about the time and place of an attack,
thereby achieving surprise. An important task for the planners of Operation
PEDESTAL was to develop a plausible deception plan. Geography alone severely
limited their options. The deception target, the Axis high commanders, would
know that any large convoy with heavy escort starting from either Gibraltar or
Alexandria was bound to the island of Malta. In other words, the ultimate objec-
tive of Operation PEDESTAL was too transparent to the enemy. The Allied plan-
ners envisaged a feint in the eastern Mediterranean (Operation M.G. 3) aimed
at preventing the Axis commanders from committing all of their available forces
against the Allied forces in the western Mediterranean. They contemplated a
convoy (M.W.12) composed of three merchant ships under cover of a task force
of two cruisers and five destroyers to sail from Port Said to a position about 100
miles west-southwest of Crete.76 They would sail out on D.2 as soon as possible
after receiving information that the WS.5.21.S convoy had passed through the
Strait of Gibraltar, or on D.3 if they did not receive that report.77 The intent was
to lure the Italian 8th (Naval) Division at Navarino, and to keep down the
Luftwaffe’s aircraft based on Crete. One Allied submarine would be deployed off
Navarino, while two other boats would be positioned further westward to inter-
cept any Italian ship sailing from the naval base at Tarent. To divert the Italians’
attention from the events in the western Mediterranean, one Allied submarine
would debark commandos off Catania to conduct a raid against a nearby air-
field.78 Admiral Syfret expected the British army to help the operation by staging
an attack in Egypt; however, he was disappointed at the army’s refusal.79 The
British army never seemed to understand the importance of Malta for the ulti-
mate Allied victory in the Mediterranean.
Naval forces attain the ultimate objective of a major operation by dividing it
into several phases related in time and space. In general, a phase is the time be-
tween the accomplishment of two successive intermediate objectives. Depend-
ing on the success of the intermediate objectives, strategists plan phases to take
place simultaneously or sequentially. The main purpose of phasing is to stagger a
major naval operation into several parts to avoid overshooting the point of cul-
mination before achieving the next intermediate objective. The operational
commander should not arbitrarily break down a major naval operation into
phases, unnecessarily slowing down the operational tempo. Operation
PEDESTAL consisted of four related phases: assembly of the convoy at Clyde River
estuary, Scotland, and its transit to Gibraltar; transit from Gibraltar to the
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Sicilian Narrows; transit from the Sicilian Narrows to La Valletta, Malta; and re-
turn of forces of distant cover and support/direct screen to Gibraltar.
A major naval operation cannot be successful unless it is adequately, reliably,
and logistically supported and sustained. In general, sustainment is the exten-
sion of logistical support from the start of combat actions until the ultimate ob-
jective is accomplished. Operational sustainment is required to support combat
forces throughout all phases of a major operation. Because of the long distances
involved, the short-legged destroyers needed refueling during the convoy’s tran-
sit. Malta was not in a position to provide fuel. The lessons of the Arctic and
Malta convoys showed the need to have tankers to accompany the convoy and es-
corts. Force R would perform this critically important task. The plan envisaged
that Force R enter the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar together with the
main force, and then wait near the convoy route to refuel the destroyers as
needed.80
Preparations
The Allies envisaged conducting a three-day exercise west of the Strait of Gibral-
tar prior to the passage of the convoy through the strait (called Operation
BERSERK). The main purpose of the exercise was to rehearse fighter direction and
cooperation among the three carriers.81 Forces deployed to take part in the exer-
cise were as follows: Force M from the United Kingdom (Victorious, the cruiser
Sirius, and three destroyers), Force K from Freetown (Indomitable, the cruiser
Phoebe, and three destroyers), Force J from Gibraltar (Eagle, the cruiser
Charybdis, and three destroyers), and Force W from Freetown (one fleet oiler
and two corvettes).82 The exercise was to start on D-5 (6 August).83
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS: THE AXIS
The Axis command structure in the Mediterranean was highly centralized at the
national-strategic level and highly fragmented at the operational level. The Ital-
ian dictator Benito Mussolini concentrated all authority over Italian armed
forces in his own hands. He was simultaneously Minister of War, Minister of the
Navy, and Minister of the Air Force from late 1933 until the end of his regime in
July 1943. He appointed undersecretaries who served as chiefs of staff of the re-
spective services. Chief of the Staff of the Supreme General Staff (Capo di Stato
Maggiore Generale) was nothing but a technical adviser without any command
responsibility. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring of the Luftwaffe was in control of
the German ground forces in the theater. Yet he did not have any control over the
German-Italian campaign in North Africa or over the organization of convoys
to Libya. Responsibility for convoying service remained in the hands of the Ger-
man liaison officer to the Italian Supreme Command (Commando Supremo).
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The two German air corps (Fliegerkorps), II and X Air Corps, deployed in the
Mediterranean, were subordinate to the normal chain of command of the
Luftwaffe. Kesselring had some responsibilities for the conduct of the German
naval operations in the Mediterranean because he was nominally in control of
the new Naval Command Italy (Marinekommando Italien) created in Novem-
ber 1941. However, that command was at the same time subordinate to the
Kriegsmarine’s regular chain of command. The German command structure in
Italy was highly fragmented and service rivalries considerably hampered their
full cooperation in the conduct of operations. To make the situation worse, there
was little unity of effort in the employment of the German and the Italian forces
in the Mediterranean theater. Neither the Germans nor the Italians fully trusted
their nominal partners. Kesselring had the authority only to coordinate but not
to prepare plans for the joint employment of the German and Italian forces. He
had some influence on the employment of the Italian air squadrons for the pro-
tection of convoys to North Africa. The Italian Navy resisted all German at-
tempts to influence its operations. Another problem with the Italian Navy was
that ships from different squadrons never trained together. The Italian Navy’s
high command also constantly interfered with the responsibilities of its tactical
commanders.84
What the Axis Knew
In contrast to the Allies, the Italians and Germans lacked information about the
Allied plans and intentions. However, they had a reasonably accurate knowledge
of the enemy order of battle and movement of his forces once they entered the
Mediterranean. The main sources of information for the German and the Italian
commanders were reports by the Abwehr agents in the Gibraltar area and Ceuta,
and reports from reconnaissance aircraft and submarines. Unbeknownst to the
Germans, the Allies intercepted and read all their Enigma coded messages.
Reliable reports from the Abwehr agents concerning the activity of enemy air
and naval forces in the western Mediterranean convinced Kesselring on 5 August
that the Allies were preparing a large-scale operation to supply Malta from the
west.85 The Germans believed that in conjunction with this operation, the en-
emy would try to pin down the Axis forces by launching a simultaneous attack
with limited objectives against Panzerarmee Afrika. Specifically, they assumed
that the Allies would mount a combined attack from the sea, the ground, and the
air to capture Mersa Matruh. The activity of the enemy air forces in Egypt and
on Malta was remarkably light in view of their known strength. They took this as
a sign of preparations for a large-scale operation. The enemy was holding in re-
serve forces on Malta to support, by bombing attacks on Italian naval forces and
by fighter protection, the transit of an enemy convoy through the Sicilian
1 2 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
22
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 1, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/8
Narrows.86 At the same time, the Germans considered the possibility of a threat
to Crete by the Allied forces in the eastern Mediterranean coinciding with the
passage of the convoy to Malta from the west. Hence, Kesselring ordered in-
creased readiness of the Luftwaffe units in both Sicily and Crete. He also directed
redeployment of aircraft from Crete to Sardinia and Sicily on 5 August.87 The II
Air Corps increased the combat readiness of its bombers and fighters and
planned to employ its aircraft sparingly. Kesselring also ordered the II Air Corps
to prepare to accommodate reinforcements from X Air Corps that would be
transferred for short-term employment and would, in cooperation with the IAF,
strengthen the ground organization at Elmas, Sardinia. He also directed as a pre-
paratory measure opening discussions with the IAF about joint employment of
the German and Italian forces in the pending operation.88
The Allies learned through Enigma that the Luftwaffe had difficulty with sup-
plies in Sardinia, which prevented the movement there of long-range bomber
forces and fighter operations to the full extent intended. They also had informa-
tion that the Germans transferred from the eastern to western Mediterranean
forty to forty-five long-range bombers and six twin-engined fighters. This, in
turn, complicated the German situation in North Africa. Air Commander
(Fliegerfuehrer) Afrika was forced to shift operations on the front to provide
convoy escorts in the Tobruk area. If Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Commander
of the Panzer Army Afrika (formerly Panzer Group Afrika) had been heavily en-
gaged at the time, it seems doubtful whether even these limited reinforcements
could have been spared.89
On the morning of 8 August, a German report indicated (erroneously) that
one Argus-class carrier and four destroyers had sailed into Gibraltar. The
Abwehr reported intensive shipping traffic in the Strait of Gibraltar on the night
of 8–9 August.90
Plans
The Germans and Italians prepared their plans separately. They decided to co-
operate but to employ their forces independently in the forthcoming operation.
Specifically, the Luftwaffe’s II Air Corps in Sicily coordinated the planning of the
attacks with the sector command of the Italian Air Force in Sicily. However, they
conducted the attacks independently.91
Supermarina (Italian naval headquarters) considered four possible courses of
action for the enemy in the pending operation. The first course of action was to
use superior naval strength for the protection of the convoy. The second course of
action open to the enemy was a sortie by the main battle force to provoke the Ital-
ians to react in force. The third course of action was to use a strong covering force
for the convoy to force a passage to the north of Pantelleria instead of turning
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westward at the entrance to Skerki Bank. The fourth course of action open to the
enemy was to carry out attacks by carrier-based aircraft on Sardinia aimed at de-
stroying the Italian airfields there and thereby facilitating the convoy passage.92
Forces Available
The Germans and Italians possessed substantial and diverse forces in the theater
to inflict large losses on the Allied convoy and its covering forces. The Italians
had available for the operation 328 aircraft (ninety torpedo-bombers, sixty-two
bombers, twenty-five dive-bombers, and 151 fighters), while the Germans had
456 aircraft (328 dive-bombers, thirty-two high-level bombers, and ninety-six
fighters).93 The German II Air Corps mainly supported the Afrika Korps. The
major part of the newly trained torpedo-bombers moved from the Mediterra-
nean to Norway in June 1942 and did not return in time for the operation. About
twenty Ju-88s from two air groups of the X Air Corps on Crete moved to Sicily
on 11 August and were ready for the action the next morning. An additional
eight Ju-88s from Crete flew to Sicily on 12 August after completing convoy es-
cort duties in the Aegean.94
The Italian Navy theoretically had available for the operation four battle-
ships, three heavy and ten light cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, twenty-eight
torpedo boats, and sixty-four submarines. However, the Italians were unable to
deploy most of their heavy ships because of the lack of fuel and adequate air
cover. The Italian Navy received only twelve thousand tons of fuel in June 1942,
enough to cover about one-fifth of that consumed by convoys (fuel reserves then
amounted to about 121,000 tons). The Italian battleships were directed to empty
their fuel for escorts. Because of this severe shortage of fuel, Mussolini suggested
to Hitler that further enemy attempts to supply Malta could be opposed only by
submarines and land-based aircraft.95 Supermarina was able to deploy for the
pending operation the 3rd (Naval) Division with three eight-inch cruisers
(Gorizia, Bolzano, and Trieste) and seven destroyers and the 7th (Naval) Division
with three six-inch cruisers (Eugenio di Savoia, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and
Muzio Attendolo) and five destroyers plus eighteen submarines, and nineteen
torpedo boats (six MS [Motoscafo Siluranti] and thirteen MAS [Motoscafo
Armato Siluranti]). The Germans could deploy two U-boats and four S-boats
(torpedo boats).96
The Italian and German air forces did not have a sufficient number of fighters
to escort surface ships, bombers, and torpedo bombers. Mussolini favored the use
of fighters to escort bombers instead, providing cover for surface forces to attack
the convoy.97 Kesselring did not approve the Italian request to provide air cover for
the Italian fleet. He believed that the Luftwaffe lacked a sufficient number of fight-
ers to provide escort for both his bombers and the Italian fleet.98 Reportedly,
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Kesselring was convinced that, based on the experience of the Second Battle of
Syrte (22 March 1942) and the encounter off Pantelleria (15 June 1942), the Ital-
ian heavy cruisers would not be successful even if they had air cover.99 The Ger-
mans used the pretext of the lack of fuel to refuse to provide air cover for the
Italian heavy surface forces.100 However, the German naval attaché in Rome, Ad-
miral Eberhard Weichhold, argued that the Luftwaffe should provide air cover
for the Italian ships.101 The Italian Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Ugo
Cavallero, thought that the Italian surface forces should be employed in the
forthcoming operation. However, the Supermarina did not want to take the re-
sponsibility of using its heavy surface forces without air cover.102
Operational Idea
The Axis operational idea was relatively simple compared to the one applied by
the Allies (see map 2). The Germans and Italians essentially followed almost the
same script as in their plan against the enemy major convoy in September 1941
(Operation HALBERD). Their plan envisaged a joint special air reconnaissance of
the western Mediterranean by the Italian and Luftwaffe aircraft on 11 and 12 Au-
gust.103 The Italian and German aircraft based on Sicily and Sardinia, the Italian
submarines and German U-boats, the Italian and German torpedo boats, and
minefields would be employed in the forms of successive barriers. These four
barriers were intended to cause the dispersal of the convoy and thereby allow
successful attack by a powerful cruiser-destroyer force.104
The intent of the Germans and the Italians was to employ a force of
twenty-two torpedo-bombers heavily escorted by fighters, about 125
dive-bombers also with fighter escorts, and forty high-level bombers in a tightly
synchronized attack. The IAF would conduct the main attack. The Luftwaffe’s
air attacks would be conducted in two waves and be coordinated in terms of
time.105 The principal aim would be to destroy the enemy aircraft carriers first so
that they would be unable to intervene when the Italian heavy surface forces
closed in on the remnants of the convoy.106 The Italians planned to deploy seven-
teen submarines in the western Mediterranean while the Germans had only two
U-boats available.107 Seven Italian and two German U-boats would be deployed
north of Algeria between longitudes 01° 40' E and 02° 40' E.108 The Italians
would deploy ten submarines between Fratelli Rocks and the northern entrance
to the Skerki Bank.109 Some of these submarines would be positioned northwest
of Cape Bon to operate in cooperation with aircraft.110 In addition, an Italian
submarine would be deployed west of Malta, another off Navarino, and three
boats about a hundred miles west-southwest of Crete.111
During the war, the Italians laid a large number of mines in the Sicilian Nar-
rows between June 1940 and April 1942. About 2,320 mines were laid between
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Cape Granitola (at the southwestern tip of Sicily) and Pantelleria; 1,020 mines
between Pantelleria and Ras el Mustafa, Tunisia; 6,880 mines between the
Aegadian Islands (west of Trapani, Sicily) and Cape Bon; and 1,040 mines be-
tween Bizerte and Keith Rock.112 The Italians planned to lay down a temporary
minefield off Cape Bon by an Italian destroyer in the night of 12 August, or one
day before the enemy convoy was expected to transit the area.113 In the night of
12–13 August, the Italians planned to deploy nineteen Italian torpedo boats
(thirteen MAS, six MS) and four German S-boats south of Marettimo and off
Cape Bon and eventually off Pantelleria.114
The Italian plan contemplated that the 3rd (Naval) Division and the 7th (Na-
val) Division would join about a hundred miles north of Pantelleria in the after-
noon of 12 August and then sail on the intercept course south of Pantelleria
All’alba through the night of 12–13 August.115 They would attack the remnants
of the convoy and its direct screen (Force X) south of Pantelleria at first light.116
They based this timing on the possibility that Axis aircraft could provide effec-
tive cover with fighters because of the larger number of enemy aircraft based on
Malta. Any Allied convoy from Egypt would be dealt with by the 8th (Naval) Di-
vision based at Navarino.117 However, the Italians changed this plan on 12 Au-
gust because of its inadequate state of combat readiness. Instead, they directed
this division to move into the Ionian Sea to provide indirect support to the em-
ployment of the 3rd Naval Division. Eventually, they directed the 7th Naval Di-
vision to return to its base.118
THE EXECUTION
Operation PEDESTAL began with the sortie of the Victorious group from Scapa
Flow on 31 July. On 5 August, this group started to exercise with the Indomitable
group and Force W from Freetown.119 A day later and for the next two days, all
three large aircraft carriers with their escorts less Furious took part in Operation
BERSERK between the Azores and Gibraltar as envisaged in the original plan.
The convoy, escorted by cruisers Nigeria and Kenya and destroyers, sailed
from the Clyde during the night of 2–3 August and joined the main body the
next morning. Prior to the sortie Admiral Burrough held a meeting on board his
flagship with the masters of all the merchant ships and explained the plan in de-
tail. Shortly before Admiral Syfret left Scapa Flow, the Admiralty decided to exe-
cute Operation BELLOWS concurrently with Operation PEDESTAL.120 On 9
August, Force R left Gibraltar and sailed to a position south of Majorca.
The entire Force F passed through the Strait of Gibraltar on 10 August (D.1
Day) in a dense fog (see map 3).121 Transit was uneventful. Syfret mistakenly
believed that because of the poor visibility and moonless night it was unlikely
that enemy agents observed the Allied convoy. However, he subsequently
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acknowledged that later reports showed that the enemy was “fully cognizant of
our passage of the strait.”122
German Reports on the Convoy
The Germans had an approximately accurate picture of the movement of the en-
emy convoy and accompanying naval forces from their passage through the
Strait of Gibraltar during the night of 9–10 August until the end of the opera-
tion. Agents in the Gibraltar area and Ceuta made the initial sightings. After-
ward the Germans and Italians received a steady stream of reports from their
reconnaissance aircraft and submarines. By intercepting and decoding Enigma
messages, the Allies for their part had almost perfect and timely information on
what the Germans knew and their planned reaction to the Allied movements
and actions.
At about 0800 on 10 August, German aircraft detected the enemy convoy sail-
ing in three groups on an easterly course. At 1130, Tetuan was directed to pass
sighting reports from Alboran (Island) to Madrid.123 At 1245, the Germans re-
ported that the enemy convoy was about seventy nautical miles north of Algiers.
The main group was composed of three battleships, probably Nelson class. The
convoy was accompanied by three carriers, including what the German errone-
ously believed was the USS Wasp, plus twenty to twenty-five cruisers and de-
stroyers and twenty large steamers westward of the van. A southern group of six
destroyers was reported to be some seventy-five nautical miles northwest of Al-
giers.124 Melilla reported that by 1800 there were no enemy ships in sight. Madrid
directed both Tangier and Ceuta to increase a state of alertness. At 1700 on 10
August, a French aircraft reported two aircraft carriers, two battleships, two
cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and twelve merchant vessels some fifty miles north
of Oran. This was the first sighting of the convoy passed by the French to the
Germans.125
On the afternoon of 10 August, Kesselring learned, based on visual observa-
tion from Tarifa and Ceuta, that a large enemy convoy, appearing to be com-
posed of forty to fifty units, including possibly two carriers and nineteen
freighters, had entered the Mediterranean. The Germans mistakenly assessed
that the carrier Argus was in Gibraltar. The enemy convoy was on an easterly
course at a speed of thirteen to fourteen knots. The Germans estimated that the
convoy would be south of Majorca by 0600 on 11 August and south of Sardinia
by the approximately same time the next day.126 The Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance
aircraft observed at about 1900 on 10 August some fifty-five nautical miles
north-northeast of Oran the enemy force composed of two battleships, two car-
riers, two cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and twelve steamships on an easterly
course. The Germans falsely believed that the enemy ships carried about
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twenty-five thousand men. This information was based on the Abwehr’s errone-
ous report that thirty-seven enemy ships, including one aircraft carrier, three
cruisers, ten destroyers, three gunboats, and nineteen freighters had entered Gi-
braltar on 25 July.127
Around noon on 10 August, Supermarina received information that about
fifty-seven British ships transited the Strait of Gibraltar on an easterly course.128
One hour later the Italians comprehended that a large number of enemy war-
ships and merchant vessels, including six large warships, had passed into the
Mediterranean during the night of 9–10 August. At 1800 the same day, the Ital-
ians believed that an enemy force comprising one battleship, two aircraft carri-
ers, four cruisers, twenty-three torpedo craft, and nineteen merchantmen were
present in the western Mediterranean.129 The Italians assumed that the British
carrier-based aircraft would attack the Italian air bases on Sardinia.
Supermarina estimated that the enemy convoy would transit longitude 10° E at
noon on 11 August and would reach Cape Bon around noon on 12 August. In
the following night, the convoy would pass through the Sicilian Narrows in the
area of Pantelleria.130
Based on air reconnaissance reports, Kesselring directed Luftwaffe’s II Air
Corps to put its long-range bombers in the highest state of combat readiness. He
also ordered preparations for the transfer of aircraft from Sicily to Sardinia, in-
cluding fighters. Kesselring transferred the Ju-88 torpedo-bomber squadron
based at Grosseto, Tuscany, to Catania, Sicily. However, because of the shortage
of fuel on Crete, it was not possible to use German transport aircraft to carry
personnel and torpedoes on 11 August. The Italian fighter aircraft would be
transferred from Sicily to Sardinia. It was also planned that the Italian fleet
would operate against the convoy as it had against the enemy convoy from the
west (Operation HARPOON) in mid-June 1942.131
The Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean
The Germans and Italians had accurate knowledge of the operational situation in
the eastern Mediterranean. Based on British radio traffic, the Germans noted
considerable presence of British forces in the eastern Mediterranean operating in
conjunction with enemy forces in the western Mediterranean. Therefore, X Air
Corps ordered a comprehensive reconnaissance of the eastern Mediterranean east
of 25° E on the morning of 11 August. The Axis convoys in the central Mediterra-
nean would continue to run for the time being according to plan.132 On 10 August,
German intelligence reported intensive enemy activity in the eastern Mediterra-
nean. The German aircraft detected a force of four enemy cruisers and ten de-
stroyers about 150 nautical miles off Port Said on a westerly course. In Alexandria,
the Germans observed one enemy destroyer, six smaller naval vessels, and thirteen
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steamers.133 The German reconnaissance aircraft reported the presence at the
Suez anchorage of five enemy destroyers, one repair ship, and one Southampton-
class cruiser.134 The Abwehr had unconfirmed information that several loaded
freighters were at Alexandria and ready to sail for Malta on 12 August. This infor-
mation, coupled with several sightings of enemy submarines off Italian and Greek
ports, led the Italians to believe that the enemy movement in the western Mediter-
ranean meant more than just a relief convoy to Malta.135
Events on 11 August
By the morning of 11 August, the Allied convoy was south of the Balearics and
headed toward Cape Bon.136 At about 0620, a U-boat sighted the enemy convoy
and its screen. A German aircraft reported at 0815 the enemy convoy approxi-
mately ninety-five miles northwest of Algiers.137 Shadowing by the Ju-88 flying
between twenty and twenty-four thousand feet started at about 0830 and con-
tinued throughout the day. Despite the presence of the enemy submarines, Force
R refueled all three cruisers and twenty-six destroyers.138
At about noon, the convoy was about seventy-five miles south of Majorca and
sailing straight east on a zigzag course. Operation BELLOWS was executed be-
tween 1230 and 1515 from a position of approximately 585 miles from Malta.
Out of thirty-eight Spitfires that flew-off from Furious, all but one machine
reached Malta safely.139 The Allies suffered a major loss when U-73 penetrated
the screen and sank with four torpedoes the 27,230-ton (full load) carrier Eagle
about eighty miles north of Algiers.140 The carrier sank in only eight minutes;
260 men and all aircraft were lost. The Allied ships suffered attacks from six
groups of six to twelve Ju-88s at dusk on 11 August; however, they reported no
damage.
The Allies learned from Enigma that at 1155 on 11 August, the Italian
six-inch cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Raimondo Montecuccoli (7th Division)
based at Cagliari were directed by Supermarina to be at two hours’ notice from
1800 on 11 August. These cruisers, together with eight-inch cruisers Bolzano
and Gorizia at Messina, were informed at 1300 that the Italian submarines were
operating in an area sixty miles long and forty miles wide north of Bizerte. Three
enemy submarines were observed leaving Cagliari at 2045 on 11 August. At 1800
on 11 August, the six-inch cruisers Raimondo Montecuccoli and Eugenio di
Savoia and two destroyers sailed from Cagliari on an easterly course.141
Allied intelligence learned on 11 August that the Panzerarmee Afrika believed
that the enemy convoy in the western Mediterranean posed a direct threat to
Tobruk. Hence, the Germans issued orders for the highest degree of alert for
their forces and took a series of defensive measures. Kesselring believed that the
enemy might try to land on the North African coast. The next day, he issued the
V E G O 1 3 7
31
Vego: Major Convoy Operation to Malta, 10–15 August 1942 (OperationPEDE
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
order of the day, in which he suggested that such landings would influence oper-
ations in Africa, something the Axis must not allow to happen. On the same day,
the Luftwaffe’s air district (Luftgau) Afrika apparently believed that the landing
might take place at Tripoli on 13 or 14 August.142
Situation and Actions on 12 August
At 0020 on 12 August, the Allies learned that Italian intelligence had sighted four
enemy cruisers and ten destroyers; part of the convoy from Gibraltar, the Italians
thought, might be proceeding to the eastern Mediterranean.143 They also inter-
cepted and decoded operation orders issued by the II Air Corps for 12 August to
the 77th fighter wing based at Elmas, Sardinia, to expect an enemy formation ap-
proaching the Sicilian Narrows in the early morning of 12 August. The II Air
Corps would cooperate with the IAF in Sicily and Sardinia from the early morn-
ing of 12 August onward to attack and destroy enemy merchant vessels before
they could reach Malta. They would operate in waves with fighter escorts.144
Allied intelligence concluded that the movement of a large convoy with
strong naval forces from Gibraltar, in conjunction with diversionary naval oper-
ation in the eastern Mediterranean, had a major effect on the Germans and the
Italians. It induced a sense of great uncertainty and apprehension along the en-
tire North African coast and in Crete lest a landing take place. The Allied move-
ments also forced the Germans to take several precautionary measures. The
Germans recognized by 11 August that if a threat to Crete existed it would mate-
rialize before 14 August. The Allies had little further indication that the Ger-
mans were much concerned at this possibility.145 On 12 August, the Germans
initiated defensive measures in the Benghazi-Tripoli area. One single-engine
fighter squadron and the available long-range bombers based at Derna were pre-
pared to move to Benghazi or Tripoli as necessary. The Ju-52s essential for the
transport of ground personnel, equipment, and ammunition were put in readi-
ness. Panzerarmee Afrika held motorized detachments ready to repel landings.
It moved some forces to the Sollum–Mersa Matruh area to defend the coast east
of Tobruk with three large motorized groups of artillery. At 0700 on 12 August,
all the shipping from North Africa to Italy and the Aegean was suspended.146 In
the late afternoon on 12 August, the Luftwaffe believed that the British might at-
tempt a landing at Tripoli on 13 or 14 August. Hence, they sent fighters and
dive-bombers there from Sicily with supplies of ammunition and fuel. The Ger-
mans also took precautions in case the Allies threatened Benghazi.147
On 12 August, the Allies intercepted a message from the CINC Luftwaffe
Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering stating that the Luftwaffe units under CINC
South (Kesselring) “will operate with no other thought in mind than the de-
struction of the British convoy.” He ordered the first operations directed against
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enemy aircraft carriers and transports. “The destruction of this convoy is of de-
cisive importance.”148
By reading Enigma messages the Allies learned that at 1830 on 12 August the
Luftwaffe was informed that an S-boat flotilla of five (actually four) boats was
due to sail from Porto Empedocle, Sicily, at 1600 on 12 August on a westerly
course for Cape Bon. After completing their mission, the enemy torpedo boats
would leave Cape Bon at about 0430 on 13 August sailing on a northerly course
as far as 39° N and then turn south toward Marettimo and then hug the coast to
Augusta.149 The Allies also received the information that at 2145 on 12 August,
the II Air Corps assessed that the enemy forces in the western Mediterranean
consisted of fifty-one ships including two carriers, two battleships, seven cruis-
ers, and twenty destroyers. The Germans erroneously believed in the presence of
one U.S. Yorktown-class aircraft carrier but correctly identified the presence of
the battleships Rodney and Nelson. They also estimated that the convoy con-
sisted of thirteen freighters totaling some 105,000 tons. Defense of the enemy
convoy consisted of ten to sixteen fighters and strong AA fire of all calibers.150
The enemy aircraft started to shadow Force F at 0500 on 12 August; throughout
the day, the Allied forces were under continuous observation by the German and
Italian bombers. The enemy bombers were progressively more strongly protected
by the fighters. Throughout the day, there were numerous attacks on the Allied
ships by the Italian high-level bombers and the German dive-bombers. In their ef-
forts to sink as many enemy ships as possible, the German and Italian aircraft used
every type of attack, including laying mines ahead of the Allied ships.151
On the afternoon of 12 August, the German aircraft received orders that un-
der no circumstances were they to attack damaged ships or those left behind.152
The enemy aircraft were present in large numbers from 1600 to 2000. Between
1800 and 1850 there was a very heavy attack by about forty Ju-88s and Ju-87s co-
ordinated with about twenty Italian Cant 1007 torpedo-bombers. Three bombs
struck the carrier Indomitable, with two or three near misses. Indomitable was
unable to operate aircraft but was capable of steaming at twenty-eight and a half
knots.153 An aerial torpedo hit the destroyer Foresight and friendly forces subse-
quently sank it. In the attacks during the day, the Germans believed that they
damaged one enemy aircraft carrier, cruiser, and destroyer each plus one
twenty-thousand-ton merchant ship.154
Originally Syfret intended that Force Z would turn westward upon reaching
the Skerki Bank at 1915 and he informed the fleet accordingly. However, because
of the twenty-minute delay in reaching the position due to the enemy air attacks,
he made a decision to turn Force Z westward at 1855, while Force X would pro-
ceed to Malta. The enemy apparently did not notice the withdrawal of Force Z
until 2030. In view of the magnitude of enemy air attacks from 1830 to 1850,
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Syfret believed that it was unlikely that the enemy would carry out any further
major attack before dark. He also hoped, as it turned out quite mistakenly, that
reaching Skerki Bank would eliminate the danger from enemy submarines. In
his view, the greatest dangers to Force X were enemy torpedo boats during the
night and aircraft by day. However, it was exactly after Force Z reversed its course
westward that the Ju-87 attacked Force X and the convoy between 2000 and
2100. Around 2000, the Italian submarines torpedoed cruisers Nigeria and Cairo
and the tanker Ohio. Nigeria was damaged but was able to return to Gibraltar,
while Ohio was towed to Malta. Cairo was abandoned and eventually sank. At
2112, the cruiser Kenya was also torpedoed and damaged by an Italian subma-
rine, while one freighter (Deucalion) was torpedoed and sunk at 2212 near the
Cani Rocks in the Sicilian Narrows.155
The Allies obtained information from Enigma that the eight-inch cruiser
Trieste sailed to the southward from a northern Tyrrhenian port during the
night of 11–12 August. Between 0840 and 1000 on 12 August eight-inch cruisers
Bolzano and Gorizia with four destroyers sailed from Messina northward and at
0930, the six-inch cruiser Muzio Attendolo with two destroyers sailed from Na-
ples.156 The Enigma intercepts indicated that an unknown Italian naval force re-
ceived orders at 1835 on 12 August to proceed south at twenty knots and join
with other forces some ninety miles north of Trapani. These were probably
cruisers from Messina and Cagliari. At 1945, Rome directed these forces to be
ten miles east of Pantelleria at 0530 the next morning. Rome also informed the
cruiser force that all Italian torpedo boats would patrol the area west of 11° 40' E
with orders to leave their patrol at dawn on 13 August and proceed toward
Pantelleria. At 2200, the cruiser force was directed to reduce speed to arrive off
San Vito, northeast of Trapani, not before midnight on 12–13 August. However,
at 2345 on 12 August they abruptly abandoned this operation. Cruisers Eugenio
di Savoia and Raimondo Montecuccoli with three destroyers received orders to
proceed to Naples, while cruisers Gorizia, Bolzano, Trieste, and Muzio Attendolo
and the remaining destroyers would proceed to Messina.157 The reason for this
decision was probably the RAF’s demonstration to convince the enemy that a
much larger striking force was on the way to attack the Italian surface force.158
Actions on 12–13 August
At about midnight on 12–13 August the Allied convoy passed through the en-
emy mine fields in the Sicilian Narrows. The attenuated line of merchant ships
and the reduced number of escort ships provided many opportunities for at-
tacks by enemy torpedo boats lying in ambushing position off Kelibia, near Cape
Bon. In the subsequent attacks by the enemy torpedo boats, they torpedoed and
sank the cruiser Manchester and three merchant ships. In the morning, another
1 4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
34
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 1, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/8
merchant vessel was lost from either a torpedo fired by an enemy boat or a mine.
These night attacks added to the convoy’s disorganization. At daylight the scat-
tered ships were comparatively easy prey for enemy aircraft. By 0700 Force X and
the convoy were about 120 miles west of Malta. In the attacks by the enemy air-
craft, three more merchant ships were sunk. At about 1600, the Malta Escort
Force took over the protection of the convoy and Force X turned westward.159 In
the early morning of 13 August, a British submarine (Unbroken) fired four tor-
pedoes from its ambushing position some twelve miles south of Stromboli Is-
land, hitting and damaging heavy cruiser Bolzano and light cruiser Muzio
Attendolo.160
OPERATION M.G. 3 FAILS
As planned, the Allies carried out Operation M.G. 3, a feint to distract enemy at-
tention in the eastern Mediterranean. The convoy, M.W.12, composed of three
merchant ships, sailed out of Port Said after dusk on 10 August, accompanied by
two cruisers, ten destroyers, and two escorts, while one merchant ship escorted
by two cruisers and three destroyers left Haifa at 0300 on 11 August. These two
forces were concentrated in the early morning of 11 August and sailed westward
to the longitude of Alexandria; afterward they turned back and dispersed. The
intention was to lure the Italian 8th (Naval) Division at Navarino and to keep
down the Luftwaffe’s aircraft on Crete.161 The German aircraft observed these
movements. In the early morning of 12 August, Kesselring informed X Air Corps
of the position (33° 40' N and 28° 34' E) of four enemy merchant vessels, six
cruisers, and an unknown number of destroyers sailing on a northeasterly
course at a speed of twelve knots. He believed that this convoy was possibly an
English wireless-telegraphy spoof. However, Kesselring did not exclude the pos-
sibility of a simultaneous supply operation from the eastern Mediterranean. He
ordered the X Air Corps to arrange exhaustive reconnaissance of the entire east-
ern Mediterranean area on the morning of 12 August.162
In the night of 12–13 August the Allied cruisers and destroyers shelled the
port of Rhodes, while the RAF aircraft attacked airfield Maritsa (on the northern
tip of Rhodes) during the day. A British submarine debarked commandos at
Simeto, near Catania, to put explosives to the pylons. However, the Italians were
apparently not surprised by the Allied actions. Their 8th (Naval) Division re-
mained at port. The Germans detached one of their destroyers from escort duty
and sent it to reinforce the Italian forces. The Italians held up local traffic along
the North African coast and stopped the shipping traffic between Italy and
Greece. Operation M.G. 3 failed to deceive the Axis and reduce the intensity of
its attacks on the main convoy in the western Mediterranean.163
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FINAL MOVEMENTS
The Allies also executed Operation ASCENDANT as originally planned. Force Y left
Malta about 2030 on 10 August. It reached the area of Cape Bon the next day and
arrived at Gibraltar at about 1000 on 14 August. The carrier Furious and accompa-
nying five destroyers arrived at Gibraltar at 1900 on 12 August. Force R cruised in
the western basin until it was certain that it would not be required; then it received
orders to return to Gibraltar, arriving in the morning of 16 August.164
Despite the enemy’s all-out effort to destroy the remnants of the Allied convoy,
five ships eventually reached Malta. Two of these ships had sustained so much
damage that they almost sank.165 The tanker Ohio survived but never sailed
again. The Allies lost one carrier (Eagle), two cruisers (Manchester and Cairo),
and one destroyer (Foresight), while another carrier (Indomitable), two cruisers
(Nigeria and Kenya), and three destroyers were put out of commission for a con-
siderable time. Some 350 men lost their lives. The Fleet Air Arm lost thirteen air-
craft in combat and sixteen Sea Hurricanes (sunk with Eagle).166 The Allies were
unable to risk such losses again soon after the completion of Operation
PEDESTAL. They would not attempt another large convoy operation to resupply
Malta until November 1942.167
The Axis forces did not accomplish their stated operational objective, al-
though they achieved a great tactical victory. Especially noteworthy were the
successes achieved by the Italian MS/MAS. The German U-boat sank one air-
craft carrier while the Italian submarines sank one cruiser (Cairo) and two mer-
chant ships. The Italian and German torpedo boats sank one cruiser
(Manchester) and three merchant ships.168 The Axis aircraft damaged one carrier
(Indomitable) and three merchant vessels. An Italian submarine damaged one
enemy cruiser (Nigeria), and an Italian submarine damaged another cruiser
(Kenya). Italian and German torpedo boats crippled two merchant vessels. An
Italian submarine and the German bombers heavily damaged the tanker Ohio.169
Allied submarines damaged two Italian cruisers (Bolzano and Muzio Attendolo),
and neither again put to sea. The Axis lost forty-two aircraft.170 Allied destroyers
sank two Italian submarines (Cobalto and Dagabur), while the Allied aircraft
damaged one Italian submarine (Giada).171
Despite heavy losses, Operation PEDESTAL was in retrospect a clear opera-
tional success for the Allies. About thirty-two thousand tons of supplies arrived
safely, allowing Malta to survive for another ten weeks. By 22 August, all cargo
was unloaded from the five surviving ships as well as fifteen thousand tons of
fuel carried by Ohio. The enemy did not attempt to interfere with the unloading
of cargo.172 While Operation PEDESTAL was in progress, three Allied submarines
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carried ammunition, torpedoes, and aviation fuel from the east to Malta. The
supply trips with Allied submarines continued in September and October
1942.173 These supplies allowed the Allied submarines and aircraft to intensify
their attacks on the Axis supplies to North Africa during the most decisive phase
of the campaign. The Allies were able to obtain air superiority over Malta and
thereby dramatically change the situation in the central Mediterranean to their
favor.174 During September 1942, the Allies sank more than 100,000 tons of en-
emy supplies destined for North Africa. By mid-October, the Afrika Korps had
only three days’ supply in reserve instead of the minimum fifteen days’ to start an
offensive. In November 1942, the Axis lost the Battle of El Alamein and the tide
of war in North Africa turned in the Allied favor.175
CONCLUSION
Operation PEDESTAL took place at a time when the Allied fortunes in the Medi-
terranean were at their nadir. The island of Malta was close to being unable to
serve as the air and submarine base for the Allied efforts against the Axis forces
in North Africa. The Axis forces on the ground were forced to stop their advance
after the inconclusive first battle of El Alamein. However, the German and Ital-
ian forces were still within striking distance of the Nile Valley. They were prepar-
ing to resume their advance and seize Egypt as soon as they had sufficient reserve
of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. For the Allies, it was vital that Malta re-
mained in their hands; otherwise, the Axis would be able to resume its advance
and by seizing Egypt radically improve its position in the Middle East. The oper-
ational decision to run a major resupply operation to Malta was made by the
strategic leadership in London, not by the Admiralty or the fleet commanders in
the theater.
In the summer of 1942, the Allied command organization in the Mediterra-
nean was highly fragmented. No single commander had the authority and re-
sponsibility for the planning and employment of all three services. The basic
plan for the operation was prepared in London. Plans in support of the opera-
tion were prepared by the respective service component commanders in the
Mediterranean. These headquarters were separated by long distances. The mis-
sion’s success depended almost entirely on cooperation among the services.
However, strong parochialism among services made that task very difficult. The
British army was unwilling to support the operation by conducting a diversion-
ary attack although the survival of Malta was vital for the Allied campaign in
North Africa.
The Allies’ single greatest advantage was their ability to timely intercept and
decode the German Enigma messages. This, in turn, allowed Allied commanders
to obtain generally accurate and detailed knowledge of the enemy’s plans,
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actions, and pending reactions. The Allies possessed excellent knowledge of the
strength and the planned movements of the Luftwaffe’s units in the Mediterra-
nean. They also had reliable knowledge of the strength and movement of Italian
submarines and surface forces. Their assessment of the U-boats’ strength was
faulty.
Planning for Operation PEDESTAL was soundly based and very thorough. A
major problem was to assign a sufficient number of freighters for the new resup-
ply effort, because of the Allied commitments to supply Soviet Russia. Another
problem was to assemble a powerful force for providing distant cover and sup-
port and direct screen of the convoy, because the Allies’ naval commitments in
the British home waters and in the Indian Ocean were stretched to the limit. The
Allies learned proper lessons from the failure of the dual convoy operation in
June 1942 and applied them for the planning of Operation PEDESTAL. The geog-
raphy of the western and central Mediterranean was a major and negative plan-
ning factor in Operation PEDESTAL. The long distances from Gibraltar to Malta,
combined with the proximity of the Axis airfields, dictated the type and number
of forces for support and the method of their combat employment.
Lack of adequate air strength on Malta greatly complicated the Allied prob-
lem of ensuring the success of the operation. The Allies lacked a sufficient num-
ber of heavy bombers on Malta to inflict substantial damage to the enemy air
bases on Sicily and Sardinia. They also lacked fighters to provide for the safety of
the convoy once it came within their striking range.
The Allied feint in the eastern Mediterranean was poorly conceived, because
the objectives in the pending operation were so obvious to the enemy. Also,
forces assigned to the feint were insufficient to compel the Germans and Italians
to weaken their forces in the western and central Mediterranean. Only a viable
threat of the Allied invasion of Crete or mainland Greece would have forced the
enemy to react operationally or even strategically. It was also quite possible that a
sizable diversionary attack by the British army in the Libyan Desert might have
forced the Germans and the Italians to divert some of their land-based aircraft
from attacking Force F.
The Axis command organization in the Mediterranean lacked not only unity
of command but also unity of effort. Both the Germans and the Italians had a
separate command structure. Each coalition partner prepared plans separately.
The German theater structure was also highly fragmented. Although Kesselring
was nominally in command of the entire southern theater, he was not in control
of the Axis campaign in North Africa, nor did he have de facto control over the
employment of the German naval forces. The Italian command organization
was chaotic because there were overlapping responsibilities and authority over
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various service forces. The higher naval authorities also constantly interfered
with the decisions and actions of subordinate tactical commanders.
The Axis powers had limited capability to intercept and decode the enemy ra-
dio messages. They relied mostly on air reconnaissance and submarine reports
for acquiring information on the locations, compositions, and movements of
the enemy forces. Yet they had a solid network of agents on both sides of the
Strait of Gibraltar. They also apparently had some agents in the Suez Canal zone.
Because of the lack of good intelligence prior to the movement of the enemy
forces, the Axis leaders made plans for the operation in mid-August largely as a
reaction to enemy actions. Nevertheless, the German and the Italian plans for
the employment of their forces were solidly based. They commanded an ex-
tremely favorable geographic position for the operations of their forces. A large
number of the Italian airfields and naval bases flanked the route of the enemy
convoys in the western and central Mediterranean. The Axis aircraft and surface
forces based on Sardinia and Sicily operated from exterior positions but along
the short lines of operations. The single major error on the German side was
Kesselring’s decision not to provide strong air cover for the Italian heavy surface
forces.
The Germans and Italians had a large number of land-based aircraft available
for attack on the enemy convoy and supporting forces in the western and central
Mediterranean. The Germans were also able to redeploy some of their aircraft
from Crete to Sicily. Despite the large number of aircraft, the Axis lacked a suffi-
cient number of fighters to provide escort to bombers and cover to surface ships.
The lack of fuel essentially immobilized the Italian battleships. The Italians were
able to assemble relatively large number of submarines in the western part of the
Mediterranean, while the Germans had only two U-boats available.
The Axis commanders had a reasonably accurate picture of the situation in
the western Mediterranean once the enemy convoy transited the Strait of Gi-
braltar. Most of their intelligence came from reports from the reconnaissance
aircraft. The Germans and the Italians exaggerated the true capabilities of the
Allied force that entered into the Mediterranean. The probable reason for that
was the sheer size of the Allied surface forces assigned in support of the convoy.
Both the German and Italian pilots showed a great deal of determination, skill,
and courage in their repeated attacks against the convoy and its supporting
forces. The Italian submarines and the U-boats achieved great success in their
attacks against both surface ships and merchant vessels. Most surprising were
the successes of the Italian and German torpedo boats against the scattered con-
voy on the night of 12–13 August. Yet the Germans and the Italians made a major
mistake in their decision to focus their attacks on the enemy’s undamaged ships.
This was most likely the reason that the oiler Ohio survived and safely reached
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Malta. The Italian decision to cancel the planned attack on the remnants of the
convoy by heavy surface forces was a great mistake and probably cost the Axis
not only tactical but also operational success.
The Allies had an almost uninterrupted stream of decoded Enigma messages,
giving them unprecedented knowledge and understanding of the enemy situa-
tion, plans, and pending actions. The Allied commanders knew the German or-
ders of the day and their intentions. Despite great odds, the Allied airmen and
sailors displayed a superb fighting spirit. This was especially true of the mer-
chant mariners. One of the major errors on the Allied side was the decision,
based on false assumptions, to turn Force Z westward. That decision resulted in
heavy Allied losses. The Allied operation M.G. 3 failed to make any impression
on the Axis commanders. This was not a surprise, because the Allies had based
the entire effort on a faulty assumption. It represented a waste of time and sorely
needed resources.
OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
One should try to identify possible lessons for the future by in-depth study of a
major operation or campaign; otherwise, there is little value in studying a naval
history for future commanders and planners. In general, the lessons learned
should be based on one’s conclusion pertaining to a certain combat action.
These lessons can be tactical or operational in terms of their scope. They should
be derived from the study of actions by both friendly and enemy forces. The op-
erational lessons learned are generally more important than tactical lessons.
Their value does not become obsolete with the passage of time, because they are
focused on the human element, not materiel. The study of a single major opera-
tion or campaign can provide only tentative lessons learned. However, the more
historical case studies are used, the more valuable operational lessons are. One
can derive the following operational lessons from the study of Operation
PEDESTAL of mid-August:
• A strategic leadership should not normally make decisions that rightfully
belong to the operational or tactical commanders. An exception is when
the strategic situation is so serious and the lack of decisive action might
have a major impact on the course or even outcome of war in a certain the-
ater. Then only strategic leadership can ensure that adequate forces are
available or become available to accomplish the ultimate objective of a ma-
jor operation or campaign.
• In making a decision, the operational commander should always carefully
weigh the potential risks versus the benefits of not only the pending major
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operation but also the effect on the campaign as a whole. In some situa-
tions, the potential losses in the pending operation might be prohibitively
high. Yet taking such a high but prudent risk can be justified if the outcome
of the operation would result in gaining valuable time for a campaign as a
whole.
• The closest degree of cooperation among services during planning and exe-
cution of a major operation or campaign should not be left at the discre-
tion of individual commanders but should be based on appointing a single
commander, thereby ensuring unity of effort through unity of command.
The lines of authority and responsibilities should be simple and clear at all
levels of command, but especially at the operational and theater-strategic
levels. A single commander and staff should optimally conduct planning
for major operations. The commanders who planned the operations should
also execute it.
• The excessive parochialism of services is one of the major factors for the
lack of necessary cooperation in drafting plans for a major operation or
campaign. It is also one of the major causes of duplication of effort,
thereby resulting in the waste of sorely needed resources and time.
• The ability to obtain accurate, reliable, timely, and relevant information on
the enemy order of battle, plans, intentions, and movements is of inestima-
ble value during the planning and execution of a major operation or cam-
paign. However, the importance of good intelligence should not be
overestimated. Having what is today called “information dominance” is
only one, and often not even the most important, among many factors in
making a sound decision. Much more important is the commander’s expe-
rience, character traits, and sound judgment. An operational commander
might also make a sound decision but still suffer a setback or even defeat
from a weaker opponent who acts faster without waiting to have a perfect
knowledge of the situation. In some situations, the weaker side can be more
successful without having the knowledge of the stronger side’s plans and
intentions but occupying a much more favorable geographic position,
having numerical or qualitative superiority, and acting with greater speed
and determination.
• In planning a major operation, the commander should avoid adding tasks
unrelated to the accomplishment of the ultimate operational objective. Ad-
ditional tasks not only unnecessarily complicate the basic plan but also re-
duce available forces for the accomplishment of the main objective.
Additional tasks also usually require more time for their accomplishment
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and thereby might considerably complicate or even endanger the outcome
of a major operation.
• A major operation is likely to be more successful if the planners also pre-
pare a plausible operational deception plan. Hence, various feints, demon-
strations, or ruses should not be conducted in isolation but should be
invariably integral to such a plan. A feint or operational deception is un-
likely to be successful if the objective is too transparent to the enemy.
Forces assigned to operational deception should pose such a threat as to
lead the enemy to react operationally or even strategically, not tactically.
• Warfare in a typical narrow sea (enclosed or semi-enclosed sea) differs con-
siderably from warfare on the open ocean or littorals bordering the open
ocean. The successful employment of one’s forces operating in a narrow sea
cannot be ensured without having an adequate degree of air superiority in
a given area of operations. Land-based aircraft are a formidable threat to
one’s surface ships operating in a narrow sea. This threat can be neutralized
effectively only by having one’s own superior airpower.
• Narrow seas also allow a weaker side at sea to inflict substantial losses on its
stronger opponent by skillful use of favorable geographic position, subma-
rines, small surface combatants, and mines.
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